While I accept the thesis, I question
its underlying assumptions. I take the wider view that war is crime, and
therefore crime is war; and therefore, “counter-insurgency” is a response to crime.
More deeply, it is only part of the same course of action that any
emergency management program follows for any disaster: Response, Protection, Recovery,
Mitigation, and Prevention.
Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counter-Insurgency by Colonel Gian Gentile (The New Press, 2013). |
Col. Gentile’s thesis is there is no such thing as
“counter-insurgency” as a separate kind of warfare. In addition, the American mass media perpetuate a myth that
the army was losing under old leadership with old ideas, but that a bold new
leader brought innovative thinking that re-directed the efforts into productive
and meaningful modes. Col. Gentile
maintains that (1) counter-insurgency is just the continued meeting of enemy
forces; (2) American military actions were always generally successful with
notable losses, failures, and errors (as is the nature of war), but no “outside
the box” innovative tactics ever were called upon; (3) historically, since
Alexander the Great (at least), every army has had to deal with civilian
resistance, whether farmers with pruning hooks or doctors repurposing artillery
ammunition into bombs under the roadway.
Col. Gentile examines the classic cases of the British in
Malaya, the French in Algeria, and the Americans in Viet Nam. In every case, he shows that success
came from continuing the offensive according to the same logic, passed from
commander to commander through each rotation. The American failure in Viet Nam was essentially sociological:
“But unless the United States was willing to stay in Vietnam for generations to do armed nation building, the collapse of South Vietnam was inevitable. In the end, firepower could not break the will of the North Vietnamese, the NLF, or the PLAF; nor could it correct the endemic problems of corruption within the South Vietnamese government and military. Moreover, it could not connect in a moral way the people of South Vietnam to the government and military. The United States and South Vietnam lost the war on all fronts.” (page 83)
His thesis is easy to agree with. He wrote for the narrow
context of armed conflict, not the wider problem of why people harm each other,
and what to do about it.
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